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Revelation of Classified Intelligence Information During Technical  
Discussions on Safeguards Against Surprise Attack


1. This paper is intended to set forth general guidance for the U.S. delegation regarding the revelation to Soviet Orbit representatives of classified information reflecting U.S. knowledge of Soviet instruments of surprise attack. It also contains a suggestion regarding the revelation to Soviet Orbit representatives of information regarding collection devices and techniques.
2. The instruments of surprise attack and the various detection devices which may be employed to observe and inspect those instruments will fall within the following general categories:
  - a. Missiles
  - b. Long-range aircraft
  - c. Tactical aircraft
  - d. Ground forces
  - e. Missile-launching submarines
  - f. Other naval forces
  - g. Other possible instruments of surprise attack.

For each of the general categories of instruments of surprise attack there exists a large body of unclassified information. Extensive

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discussion and exchange of information is possible, therefore, without revealing specific details or refinements of those instruments which still bear a security classification.

In discussions of Soviet instruments of surprise attack it is essential that we not reveal the degree of success of the US intelligence effort. Equally important is the necessity to avoid identifying those activities which have been most effectively concealed from US collection efforts by Soviet security measures.



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### 3. Missiles

Soviet possession of missiles is unclassified information. Our knowledge (and lack of knowledge) of the specific types of Soviet missiles,

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their performance characteristics, effectiveness, quantities available, test ranges and activities, and deployment to operational sites is extremely sensitive. The discussion of ballistic missiles should therefore be based on the known geographic factors, laws of physics, etc., which would govern the development of such missiles by either side, and any discussion of their ranges should be in general terms only. For example, discussion of the problems of surprise attack by ICBMs can be based on the general type of missile necessary to deliver a nuclear warhead to a distance of 4500-6000 nautical miles. It is also recommended that feasible alternative types of guidance, methods of fueling, deployment, etc., be considered, and that cruise-type missiles with ranges of 4500-6000 miles also be included.

#### 4. Long Range Aircraft

Our knowledge of the types of Soviet long range bombers (both medium and heavy) now in operational use is unclassified. The general performance characteristics of these aircraft can be ascertained by any competent technical expert on the basis of aerodynamic and other factors readily discernible from numerous Soviet public displays of the aircraft. US knowledge of the total number of such aircraft, the airfields where they are based, and the nature of their activities is

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available only from classified sources. On the other hand, general conclusions can be drawn from unclassified performance characteristics regarding Arctic basing or staging, refueling, and other requirements for long range bomber attacks against North American targets.

#### **5. Tactical Aircraft**

Our knowledge of Soviet tactical aircraft is available on an unclassified basis to approximately the same degree as is that of their long range aircraft. Again, the knowledge of total numbers, airfields where they are based, and the nature of their activities is classified. The existence and location of bases for tactical aircraft in the Soviet Zone of Germany and in the Eastern European Satellites is available from numerous sources and can, therefore, be considered to bear a relatively low security classification.

#### **6. Ground forces**

The threat of surprise attack by Soviet ground forces can be discussed on an unclassified basis in terms of the general size of the Soviet ground forces, general types of equipment and the general strength of Soviet forces in East Germany.

On the basis of geography and the known transportation grid it is possible to discuss on an unclassified basis the likely routes of

reinforcement and/or advance as well as likely staging areas. The general capacities and ranges of airborne transports and water-lift vessels can also be discussed on the basis of performance characteristics and ship tonnages.

#### 7. Missile-launching submarines

The number of Soviet missile-launching and other types of submarines available, their characteristics, capabilities and specific locations cannot be discussed on an unclassified basis. However, the existence of missile-launching submarines, as well as the capabilities of Soviet submarines to operate off the US coasts, can be discussed as unclassified information.

The threat of surprise attack by missile-launching submarines and the nature of the inspection measures necessary to guard against it can, therefore, be discussed in general terms without revealing US knowledge of the types and numbers of Soviet submarines or the specific bases from which they might operate. The nature of the inspection system required to detect preparatory operations for a submarine launched attack can be discussed in terms of a hypothetical base as well as the known Soviet fleet areas. The existence and general composition of Soviet naval fleets including submarines as well

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as surface vessels in the Barents Sea, Black Sea, Baltic and Far East areas is unclassified information.

#### 8. Other Naval forces

Submarines having been discussed in the previous paragraph, the category of "other naval forces" is reduced essentially to Soviet surface vessels. There is a sizeable naval air arm but lack of aircraft carriers makes the naval air arm a completely land-based air force. For this reason a discussion of naval air forces would be governed by the considerations presented in item 4 (Long range aircraft) and 5 (Tactical aircraft), above.

The Soviet surface fleet is essentially a short range navy and does not, of itself, pose a major threat of surprise attack against the North American continent. As an element of the Soviet armed forces it is a threat to US forces in the Far East and in the North Atlantic. The Baltic and Black Sea forces are land-locked and could be employed only in those waters in a surprise attack. The Northern and Far East naval forces have unobstructed access to open waters and could participate in surprise attacks in open ocean areas. The existence of these fleets and their base areas is unclassified information. Specific numbers of vessels in each category is classified information, but their characteristics and capabilities are quite accurately represented in the unclassified publication, Janes Fighting Ships.

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## 9. Detection Devices and Techniques

A large body of unclassified information is also available in the categories of detection devices and techniques. Exceptions to this generalization exist in the case of those special techniques and devices which are still being perfected or whose ~~capabilities~~  
~~xxx capabilities~~ have not been declassified.

In discussing performance capabilities of various detection devices, revelations should be limited to the state of the unclassified art. This limitation can best be determined by those members of the U S delegation whose respective services have developed and are operating the devices. Most of these problems will be resolved by the activities of the several sub-groups within the Instruments of Detection Working Group. These sub-groups are selecting and preparing illustrative examples of the products of their respective detection devices. These will include among ~~satellite reconnaissance photos~~ others, aerea photos, infrared photography, and charts revealing the resolution capability of radar devices. When these are made available to the senior members of the delegation their releasability will have been determined by the Working Group.

In any discussion of these devices there should be no inference that they are being employed in the US intelligence program. The

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capabilities of these devices should be discussed only in terms of illustrative examples, such as those being prepared by the above-mentioned sub-groups. In no circumstances should any revelations be made regarding the intelligence information acquired by the US through the use of these devices.

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